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Abstract 
 
A change in a country’s minimum wage will in general affect the number of workers in covered 
sector employment, uncovered sector employment, and unemployment. The impact of these labor 
market adjustments on absolute poverty will depend on how the pattern of employment 
composition changes within households and on how income is shared within households. An earlier 
paper (Fields and Kanbur, 2007) focused on the income-sharing dimension of the problem. The 
present paper focuses on household employment composition. For a particular structure of the labor 
market— one with good jobs, bad jobs, unemployment, and adult and youth workers— and with a 
particular model of how the sectoral patterns of employment are translated into household 
employment composition, we analyze the impact of minimum wages on a class of absolute poverty 
measures. The precise characterizations demonstrate the need for a nuanced appreciation of the 
impacts of a minimum wage increase, since they depend intricately on the values of key parameters 
(the poverty line, poverty aversion, labor demand elasticity, and the starting level of the minimum 
wage). Moreover, the relationship between poverty and the minimum wage is in general non-
monotonic, so that local effects can be quite different from the effects of large changes in the 
minimum wage.
                                                 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Convention of the Society of 
Labor Economists, Chicago, IL, May, 2007. 
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I.  Introduction 
Minimum wages are commonly evaluated by labor economists in one of two ways. Some 
analysts pay primary attention to the fact that a higher minimum wage increases the labor market 
earnings of those employed, while others emphasize that a higher minimum wage would normally 
be expected to reduce the number employed (Brown, 1999; Ehrenberg and Smith, 2006; 
Borjas,2005). However, an analysis of the effects of these labor market consequences on poverty, 
which is the ultimate focus of much of the policy discourse, requires two further steps. First, the 
employment composition of the labor market has to be translated into the employment composition 
of each household. Second, a method of income sharing within the household must be specified.  
In a previous paper (Fields and Kanbur, 2007), in a model with only two types of workers - 
employed and unemployed - we focused primarily on different ways that incomes might be shared 
within households and how each affected the impact of minimum wages on poverty. In the present 
paper we assume perfectly equal income sharing within the household, and focus instead on 
employment composition. We develop the household distribution of income from the labor market 
outcomes for a model with good jobs, bad jobs and unemployment, and adults and youths searching 
for jobs. Such a structure allows us, for example, to incorporate the fact that in countries such as the 
United States, many minimum wage workers live in non-poor households (Burkhauser, Couch, and 
Wittenburg, 2000). The impact of a minimum wage on poverty then depends crucially on the 
employment composition of households at different levels of income. We ask, when exactly does a 
higher minimum wage raise poverty, when does it lower poverty, and when is poverty unchanged?  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the main features of 
the model. Section III derives the effect of a small increase in the minimum wage. Section IV 
extends the analysis to large changes in the minimum wage. Section V summarizes and concludes. 
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 II.  The Model 
A. The Labor Market and Household Employment Composition 
In this paper, it is assumed that there is a fixed number of households, normalized at 1. 
Each household consists of two household members: one adult and one youth. Thus, the total labor 
supply is 2.  
The labor market has two types of jobs. High wage jobs, h, pay a wage  . The wage of 
these “good jobs” is assumed to be invariant to any changes taking place elsewhere in the labor 
market. Employment in the high wage sector, denoted x
hw
h, is determined according to a standard 
downward-sloping labor demand curve xh = f( ), f'<0. Low wage jobs, l, pay a minimum wage 
, which is determined as a matter of public policy. Employment in these “bad jobs” in the low 
wage sector is also determined according to a standard downward-sloping labor demand curve x
hwˆ
lwˆ
l = 
g( ), g’<0. It is assumed that only adults can be employed in the high wage sector. Adults who 
fail to find employment in the high wage sector, together with youths, form an undifferentiated pool 
of applicants for low wage jobs. 
lwˆ
The low wage  is of course less than the high wage , and households in which both 
members are employed earn more than households in which only one is employed. In addition, we 
assume that the low wage is greater than half the high wage. Together, these assumptions imply that  
lwˆ hw
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl www
ww +<<<< . 
These inequalities will be maintained throughout this paper.  
We now discuss the number of persons earning each of these amounts and the per capita 
household incomes. Employment in the high wage and low wage sectors are respectively  and 
. Given that the high wage sector employs only adults, the number of whom is normalized at 1, 
the number of adults seeking low wage jobs is 
hx
lx
)1( hx− . In addition, all youth (the number of which 
is normalized at 1) also seek low wage jobs. Thus, the number of applicants for low wage jobs is 
, and the probability that a low wage applicant gets a job is hx−2
h
l
x
x
−2 . An adult can be 
employed in a high wage job with probability , employed in a low wage job with hx
3 
 probability )
2
)(1(
h
l
h x
xx −− , or unemployed with probability )21)(1( h
l
h x
xx −−− .  A youth can be 
employed in a low wage job with probability 
h
l
x
x
−2  or unemployed with probability )21( h
l
x
x
−− .  
Putting these respective wages and employment probabilities together, we have six possible types 
of households, where Ai, i = h, l, u is the employment state of the adult and Yj, j=l, u is the 
employment state of the youth; see Table 1. All household members are assumed to share their 
earnings. Hence household earnings per capita is the relevant measure of the well-being of each 
individual in the household. Clearly the poorest individuals are those who live in households where 
nobody works (H6). Next come individuals in households where one member is unemployed but 
the other member is employed  in the  minimum wage sector (H4 and H5).  Given our assumption 
that the high wage is less than twice the low wage, the case where the adult has a high wage job but 
the youth is unemployed (H3) gives lower per capita income than the case where both the adult and 
the youth are employed in the low wage sector (H2).  Finally, the highest household per capita 
income occurs when the adult has a good job and the youth is employed in the minimum wage 
sector (H1). Table 1 sets out, therefore, the income distribution in this society. We turn now to the 
measurement of poverty based on this income distribution. 
 
B. How Poverty Is Measured 
Poverty in this paper is measured in absolute terms. The analysis consists of determining 
how poverty in the labor market varies with changes in . Poverty is gauged by comparing the 
household’s labor market earnings to a fixed poverty line z. The poverty line is $z per person, i.e., 
$2z per household. 
lwˆ
How high the fixed poverty line is itself allowed to vary. Five cases are analyzed in this 
paper. Moving from the lowest poverty line to the highest, they are:  
Case 1: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl wwwwwz +<<<<<   
Case 2: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl wwwwzw +<<<<<   
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 Case 3: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl wwwzww +<<<<<   
Case 4: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl wwzwww +<<<<<  
Case 5: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 zwwwww hllhl <+<<<<  
Case 1 is where the poverty line is so low that only households with all members 
unemployed are poor. Case 2 brings into the poverty net those households where one member is 
unemployed but the other member has a minimum wage job. These households will benefit from a 
rise in the minimum wage if they hold onto the minimum wage job. Case 3 widens the poverty net 
still further to include households where the adult is employed in the high wage sector but the youth 
is unemployed. Case 4 sets the poverty line at a sufficiently high level that income from two 
minimum wage jobs is not enough to pull the household out of poverty. Finally, Case 5 is the 
extreme case where the poverty line is so high that everybody is in poverty. Observers who argue 
that the minimum wage does not target poverty very well are clearly thinking of Cases 1 through 
through 4, in which non-poor households have minimum wage earners. But in Cases 2 through 5, 
poor households also have minimum wage workers. Hence in Cases 2, 3 and 4, minimum wage 
workers are to be found in both poor and non-poor households. 
 In all cases, poverty is gauged using the class of absolute poverty indices developed by 
Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984). The FGT index, denoted Pα, takes each poor person's poverty 
deficit as a percentage of the poverty line, raises it to a power α, and averages over the entire 
population.  Letting yi be the income of the i-th person, z the poverty line, q the number of poor 
persons, and n the total number of persons, the Pα  poverty measure is given by: 
 
α
α ∑
=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
q
i
i
z
yz
n
P
1
1
. (1) 
 Three specific values of α are of particular interest. As is well known, when α = 0 this 
measure collapses to the headcount ratio, the fraction of people below the poverty line. Other 
interesting values of α are when α is greater than or equal to one. Benchmark values in this range 
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 are α = 1, in which case we have the income gap measure of poverty, and α = 2, which is known as 
the squared poverty gap measure. The higher is α, the greater is the sensitivity of poverty to 
changes in the incomes of the poorest compared to the incomes of the not so poor. For these 
reasons, α  is known as the poverty aversion parameter. To allow for the social loss from poverty to 
increase at an increasing rate as incomes fall relative to the poverty line, α  must be greater than 1. 
Because of the intuitive appeal of integer values of α, it is common for empirical poverty 
researchers to choose α = 2.  Different degrees of poverty aversion will be seen to be important in 
delineating the consequences of the minimum wage for poverty. 
  We turn now to the poverty effects of higher minimum wages in this model. 
 
III.  The Poverty Effects of  a Higher Minimum Wage Within Each of the Five Cases
We have set forth five cases above. For each of these five cases, different types of tradeoffs 
are involved in raising the minimum wage. The results are summarized in Table 2. The detailed 
derivations are given in the Appendix 1. Here we will provide an intuitive discussion of the results. 
The results fall into three groups and will be discussed accordingly: 1) The results for α = 0, in 
which 0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα . 2) The results for Case 1, also in which 0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα . 3) The results for α > 1 in 
Cases 2 through 5, in which   0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0) if the elasticity of labor demand in the minimum wage 
sector η is sufficiently high (low). 
 The first set of results (for α = 0) can be understood in a similar way for all five cases. 
When α = 0, the poverty measure being used is the poverty headcount ratio. A higher minimum 
wage causes more people to become unemployed, which raises the number of households in 
poverty, i.e., 0
ˆ
0 >
lwd
dP
. Given that the P0 poverty measure focuses only on the numbers in poverty 
and not on how poor the poor are, the gains to the incomes of poor working households is not 
counted, and poverty (measured by the number in poverty) always rises. The only reason that 
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 0
ˆ
0 =
lwd
dP
(in Case 5) is that the poverty line is so high that everybody is in poverty to begin with, 
and so no further increase in poverty is possible.  
 The second set of results is for Case 1, i.e., the case in which the only poor households are 
those for which both household members are unemployed. Thus an increase in the minimum wage 
cannot possibly affect their incomes, but their numbers will increase with the rise in unemployment. 
Thus, no matter what the value of α, in this case, an increase in the minimum wage will increase 
poverty, i.e., 0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα . 
 The third set of results is for α > 1 in Cases 2 through 5. In each of these cells, 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα when η  is sufficiently high and 0
ˆ
<
lwd
dPα when η  is sufficiently low. That is, when the 
elasticity of labor demand is greater than the critical value corresponding to that particular case, as 
the minimum wage increases, poverty will increase. Poverty will rise when the unemployment 
effect of a minimum wage increase dominates the earnings effect. Of course, this is more likely the 
greater the elasticity of demand for labor. On the other hand, when the elasticity of labor demand is 
less than the critical value, as the minimum wage increases, poverty will decrease: the earnings 
effect dominates the unemployment effect. 
 This completes our analysis of how poverty changes locally with the minimum wage within 
each of the five cases. Let us now analyze what happens when changes in the minimum wage are so 
large that we move across cases. 
 
IV.  The Poverty Effects of a Large Increase in the Minimum Wage
 Section III analyzed the effects of an infinitesimal increase in the minimum wage. In this 
section, we ask what happens if the minimum is increased discretely. On the one hand, the discrete 
jump in the minimum wage can occur within a case. When this happens, the effect of the minimum 
wage on poverty is the integral of all the infinitesimal changes. No new analysis is needed when 
this happens. On the other hand, the discrete jump in the minimum wage can cause the economy to 
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 switch from one case to another. We show in this section that when such a switch occurs, the 
change in poverty may be discontinuous and, moreover, may go in the opposite direction from what 
happens on either side of the discontinuity. 
 
 A. Two Examples
It is possible to gain further insights by looking at specific numerical examples. These 
examples will then be used to derive more general results.  
The two examples we present are similar in most respects. They have the same high 
wage , the same employment at the high wage15ˆ =hw 1.0=hx , the same range of possible 
minimum wages (from 
2
ˆ hw = 7.5 to = 15), the same constant elasticity of demand for labor in 
the low wage sector  
hwˆ
η = 0.7, and the same demand for labor curve in the low wage 
sector . The two examples differ in one important respect, however: in Example 
1, the poverty line z is in the range 
ll wx ˆln7.03.0 −=
,
2
hwz < while in Example 2, the poverty line z is in the 
range .
2
hwz >  (Note: In Cases 1 and 2, ,
2
hwz <  while in Cases 3 through 5, .
2
hwz > ) For the 
calculations below, z = 5 in Example 1 and 12.5 in Example 2. 
 To analyze how poverty as measured by Pα changes with ,
ˆ
z
wl our strategy is to fix z and 
raise from the lowest possible value to the highest possible value. We do this first when lwˆ
2
hwz < and then when 
2
hwz > . 
 
 B.  Analysis for the Poverty Headcount Ratio (α = 0) 
 We start with the situation where α is chosen to equal 0, i.e., the poverty measure is the 
headcount ratio. The headcount ratio is sensitive only to the number of people below the poverty 
line but not to the severity of their poverty. This means that changing the minimum wage induces 
only an unemployment effect but no earnings effect.  
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 When Pα = 0, the unemployment effect operates in the same way in Cases 1 through 4: an 
increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the low wage sector, thereby increasing 
poverty as long as we remain within any of these four cases. In Case 5, however, everyone is poor 
and remains so, and therefore a change in the minimum wage has no effect on the poverty 
headcount. 
 What happens within a case is not the same as what happens in moving from one case to 
the next. To illustrate this point, consider Figures 1 and 2. 
 Figure 1 graphs the poverty headcount ratio P0 in Example 1. We see that P0 increases as 
the minimum wage rises within Case 2. However, there is a discontinuous fall in P0 at = 10. 
Why 10? Because that is twice the poverty line (5 in Example 1), which is the boundary between 
Case 2 and Case 1. When the minimum wage rises above 10, all of the people living in households 
with just one member employed at the minimum wage suddenly escape from poverty. We are now 
in the range of Case 1. In that range, a further increase of the minimum wage decreases 
employment and therefore raises the poverty headcount. This range ends just before the minimum 
wage equals the high wage, i.e., as   
lwˆ
.ˆ hl ww →
 Suppose we continue to maintain that 
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl www
ww +<<<<  but now
2
hwz > . 
These conditions hold in Example 2. Figure 2 graphs the poverty headcount ratio P0 in Example 2. 
The figure shows that as the minimum wage rises, P0 is constant (at 1) in Case 5 and increases 
within Cases 4 and 3. It also shows discontinuous drops at the boundaries of the Cases. The reason 
is analogous to Example 1. At the boundary between Cases 5 and 4, all of the households with the 
maximum possible earnings – that is, those in which the adult is employed in a high wage job and 
the youth in a low wage job – suddenly escape poverty. Similarly, at the boundary between Cases 4 
and 3, those households in which both the adult and the youth are employed in low wage jobs 
suddenly escape poverty. 
 These examples illustrate results that are quite general:  
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 Proposition 1: When 
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl www
ww +<<<< and 
2
hwz < , an increase in 
the minimum wage raises P0 within a case but may lower P0 if the economy crosses 
from Case 2 to Case 1. 
 
Proof: In Appendix 2 
 
Turning now to the case exemplified by Figure 2, we have the following general result: 
 
Proposition 2: When 
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl www
ww +<<<< and 
2
hwz > , an increase in 
the minimum wage leaves P0  unchanged if the minimum wage remains within Case 
5, raises P0 if the minimum wage remains within Case 4 or Case 3, and may lower 
P0 if the economy crosses from Case 5 to Case 4 or from Case 4 to Case 3. 
 
Proof: In Appendix 2| 
 
This completes our analysis of how the poverty headcount ratio P0 varies with the 
minimum wage  We turn now to the analysis of the situation where poverty is measured by the 
squared poverty gap P
.ˆ lw
2. 
 
 C.  Analysis for the Squared Poverty Gap (α = 2) 
The squared poverty gap P2 is sensitive both to the number of people below the poverty line 
and to the severity of their poverty. Changing the minimum wage will induce both an 
unemployment effect and an earnings effect. As detailed in Section III, poverty as measured by P2 
may increase or decrease depending on the relative size of these two effects. 
Figure 3 graphs the squared poverty gap P2 in Example 1. In this particular example, as the 
minimum wage increases, P2 increases in both Cases 2 and 1. This is not a general result: P2 could 
10 
 be increasing, decreasing, or change sign within either of the two Cases. Figure 4 graphs the 
squared poverty gap P2 in Example 2. In this particular example, we have a U-shaped pattern: as the 
minimum wage increases, P2 decreases in Case 5, decreases and then increases in Case 4, and 
increases throughout Case 3. This U shape is not a general result: P2 could be decreasing 
throughout, increasing throughout, or change sign depending on parameter values. The general 
result is: 
 
Proposition 3: When 
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl www
ww +<<<< , P2 is a continuous function 
of the minimum wage  .ˆ lw
 
Proof: In Appendix 2 
 
Although the behavior of P2 with respect to the minimum wage is continuous, it 
can be non-monotonic, as shown in Figure 4. This once again means that local findings, 
whether theoretical or empirical, are not necessarily a good guide to the implications of 
discrete changes. Thus, in Figure 4, while a small increase in the minimum wage for low 
values of the wage may lower poverty, a sufficiently large increase may have the opposite 
effect. On the other hand, just because an increase in the minimum wage from a particular 
starting point is observed to increase poverty is no guarantee that an increase in the 
minimum wage will have the same effect as an increase in the minimum wage from some 
other starting point. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 Fields and Kanbur (2007) brought the issue of income-sharing within the household to the 
forefront of the debate on the poverty impact of minimum wages. That paper showed how this 
poverty impact depends crucially on the income-sharing rule.  
11 
 In this paper, the following model has been used. We have assumed equal sharing within 
the household to highlight the importance of the household employment composition. Each 
household consists of one adult and one youth. There are two types of jobs, high wage jobs and low 
wage jobs. The minimum wage applies to low wage jobs. Only adults may be hired for the high 
wage jobs. Those adults not hired for the high wage jobs and all youth compete for the low wage 
jobs. Of these, the ones not hired in the low wage jobs are unemployed. This structure determines 
the employment composition of each household, which in turn determines its income. A household 
is poor if and only if its per capita earnings are below a pre-established poverty line. 
 We showed that a minimum wage increase can raise poverty, lower poverty, or leave 
poverty unchanged. The particular outcome depends on the specific balance between the high wage, 
the low wage, employment in high-wage and low-wage jobs, the elasticity of demand for labor with 
respect to the minimum wage, and the value of α chosen.  
Table 2 summarizes the patterns that arise depending on how high the poverty line is and 
which value of α is chosen. The fifteen cells of Table 2 reflect what happens within a case. In 
addition, minimum wage changes may be large enough to cause movements across cases. We 
proved three propositions relating to movements across cases, showing that P0 necessarily changes 
discontinuously when crossing cases and that P2  necessarily changes continuously when crossing 
cases. Furthermore, we demonstrated that there may be non-monotonicities in the relationship, 
which means that local results—theoretical or empirical—are not necessarily a good guide to the 
effects of discrete changes. 
The results derived here reinforce the general conclusion from Fields and Kanbur (2007) 
that no simple statement can be made about whether an increase in the minimum wage raises 
poverty, lowers poverty, or leaves poverty unchanged. A detailed analysis is needed before 
conclusions can be drawn. This strongly suggests that the nature of the policy debate should shift 
from the simplistic “yes” versus “no” format that is current to a more nuanced discussion of the 
precise conditions under which a minimum wage will or will not reduce poverty.  
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Table 1. 
Types of Households and Distribution of Earnings. 
 
Type of household Number of occurrences Total household 
earnings 
Household earnings 
per capita 
H1. ( ) lh YA , hx
h
l
x
x
−2  lh ww ˆ+  2
ˆ lh ww +  
H2. ( ) ll YA , )2
)(1(
h
l
h x
xx −− )2( h
l
x
x
−  lwˆ2  lwˆ  
H3. ( ) uh YA , hx )2
1(
h
l
x
x
−−  hw  2
hw  
H4. (  ) ul YA , )2
)(1(
h
l
h x
xx −− )21( h
l
x
x
−−  lwˆ  2
ˆ lw  
H5. ( ) lu YA , )2
1)(1(
h
l
h x
xx −−− )2( h
l
x
x
−  lwˆ  2
ˆ lw  
H6. ( ) uu YA , )2
1)(1(
h
l
h x
xx −−− )21( h
l
x
x
−−  0  0 
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Table 2. 
Summary of Results Concerning the Effect of a Minimum Wage Increase on Poverty 
as Gauged by Pα. 
 
 Case 1  Case 2  Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
α = 0 0ˆ >lwd
dPα  0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  0
ˆ
=
lwd
dPα  
α = 1 
 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  
When η  is 
sufficiently 
high (low), 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0). 
When η  is 
sufficiently 
high (low), 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0). 
When η  is 
sufficiently 
high (low), 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0). 
When 1≥η  
(<1), 
0
ˆ
≥
lwd
dPα (<0). 
 
α > 1 0ˆ >lwd
dPα  
When η  is 
sufficiently 
high (low), 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0). 
When η  is 
sufficiently 
high (low), 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0). 
When η  is 
sufficiently 
high (low), 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0). 
When η  is 
sufficiently 
high (low), 
0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  (<0). 
Note: The parameter η  is the wage elasticity of labor demand in the minimum wage sector. 
Moving from the lowest poverty line to the highest, the five cases are:  
Case 1: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl www
ww
z
+<<<<<   
Case 2: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl www
w
z
w +<<<<<   
Case 3: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl wwwz
ww +<<<<<   
Case 4: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 hll
hl wwzw
ww +<<<<<  
Case 5: .
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 z
ww
w
ww hl
l
hl <+<<<<  
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 Appendix 1: Derivations of Results in Table 2 
 
A.  Case 1: 
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 lhl
hl www
ww
z
+<<<<< .  
In this case,  and  are sufficiently high relative to z that only the households with 
both individuals unemployed are poor. The value of P
lwˆ hwˆ
α in this case is 
 
22 )
2
1)(1()0()
2
1)(1(
h
l
h
h
l
h x
x
x
z
z
x
x
xP −−−=
−
−−−=
α
α  . (2) 
Let us now see how Pα is affected by an increase in . We have lwˆ
 
l
l
hh
l
h
l wd
dx
xx
xx
wd
dP
ˆ
)
2
1)(
2
1)(1(2
ˆ −−−−−=
α . (3) 
For a standard labor demand function with 0
ˆ
<
l
l
wd
dx
, (2) is always positive – that is, poverty always 
increases as the minimum wage increases.  If, furthermore, we assume a constant elasticity of labor 
demand 0
ˆ
ˆ >−=
l
l
l
l
wd
dx
x
wη , (2) can be manipulated to produce 
 
,)
2
1)(
2
1)(1(2
ˆ
ˆ
)
2
1)(
2
1)(1(2
ˆ
ˆ
η
α
hh
l
h
l
l
l
l
hh
l
h
ll
l
xx
x
x
x
w
wd
dx
xx
x
x
wd
dP
x
w
−−−−=
−−−−−=
  
in which it is apparent that 0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  if and only if 0>η  for all α . 
 
B. Case 2: h
lh
l
hl w
ww
w
w
z
w <+<<<<≤
2
ˆ
ˆ
22
ˆ
0 . 
In Case 2, the poor households are those where both individuals are unemployed or where 
only one household member is employed and that person earns the minimum wage. In this case, 
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The effect of a higher minimum wage is obtained to be 
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If in (5), we assume constant elasticity of labor demand as before, we have: 
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The first term in (6) can be thought of as the unemployment effect; it tells us how an increase in the 
minimum wage brings about a reduction in employment. This term may be shown to be always 
positive as follows. The expression in brackets in the first term  
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positive terms, which proves that the entire first expression is always positive. The second term in 
(6) can be thought of as the earnings effect; it tells us how an increase in the minimum wage affects 
Pα  via the gain in earnings for those employed. To sign this expression, note that in Case 2, 
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In this case, the poverty group consists of households in which both individuals are 
unemployed and those in which only one household member is employed regardless of the sector of 
employment. The extent of poverty in this case is given by 
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Differentiating (7) with respect to the level of the minimum wage yields 
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If the labor demand elasticity η is assumed to be constant, equation (8) can be further manipulated 
to yield a condition in terms of η: 
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Again, the first term is the unemployment effect (which is always positive), and the second term is 
the earnings effect (which is always negative). 
 Let us look at particular values of α. It may be verified that when 0=α , for any η , 
0
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 D.  Case 4: 
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In Case 4, households in which both individuals are unemployed and in which only one 
household member is employed are below the poverty line. Moreover, if both household members 
are employed and earn the minimum wage, that household falls below the poverty line. On the 
other hand, a household with a high wage earner and a low wage earner is above the poverty line. 
This could be a possible stylization of the US labor market where about 80% of minimum wage 
21 
 earners live with a high wage earner (Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg, 2000).  The poverty 
measure in this case becomes: 
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If the labor demand elasticity η is assumed to be constant, equation (11) can be rewritten as: 
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Again, the first term on the right hand side is the unemployment effect. which can be shown to be 
always positive. (Group the first two terms in brackets together and the third and fifth terms 
together, from which we can see that the bracketed term is always positive.) The rest of the terms of 
the equation form the earnings effect, which is always negative. Looking at different values of α, 
when 0=α , for any η , 0
ˆ
>
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dPα . When 1≥α , it may be shown that 0)(
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dPα  if and only if  
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E.  Case 5: z
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For Case 5, all households fall below the poverty line regardless of the employment status 
of the household members. The poverty measure can be expressed in this case as: 
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If the elasticity of labor demand is assumed constant, (14) can be rewritten as: 
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 (15) 
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 Again, we have the unemployment effect (always positive) in the first term of the right hand side of 
the equation and the earnings effect (always negative) in the rest of the equation. 
Analyzing (15) for specific values of α, when 0=α , for any η , 0
ˆ
=
lwd
dPα . This is because 
everyone is under the poverty line, and that does not change as  increases. lwˆ
When 1=α , it is straightforward to show that for 1)(<≥η ,  0)(
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dPα . Finally, for 1>α , we 
have the condition that: 
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 Appendix 2: Proofs of Propositions 1-3 
 
Proposition 1 
 
Proof:  
1.a) From (6), 0
ˆ
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dPα within Case 2. 
1.b) From (3), 0
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dPα  within Case 1. 
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Combining results 1.a-c), Proposition 1 is proved. || 
 
 
Proposition 2 
 
Proof:  
2.a) From (15), 0
ˆ
=
lwd
dPα  within Case 5. 
2.b) From (12), 0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα  within Case 4. 
2.c) From (9), 0
ˆ
>
lwd
dPα within Case 3. 
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in Case 4. Because (18) > (19), P0 falls discontinuously at hl wzw ˆ2ˆ −= . 
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in Case 3. Because (19) > (20), P0 falls discontinuously at hl wzw −= 2ˆ . 
Combining results 2.a-e), Proposition 2 is proved. | 
 
Proposition 3 
 
Proof for 
2
hwz < :  
The continuity of P2 within each case is evident. As for the boundary, the dividing line 
between Cases 2 and 1 occurs at .2ˆ zwl =  From (4), 
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Proof for 
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4.a-c) The continuity of P2 within each case follows exactly as in 2.a-c).  
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in Case 4. Evaluated at and setting α = 2, hl wzw ˆ2ˆ −=
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4.e) The boundary between Cases 4 and 3 occurs at .ˆ zwl =  From (10), 
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Case 3. These are identical, and therefore P2 is continuous at the boundary between Cases 4 and 3. 
Combining results 4.a-e), Proposition 4 is proved. || 
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